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~ J. LOUGH, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
LYON, INCORPORATED, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Vi.rginia: 
Your petitioner, William J. Lough, respectfully represents 
that he is aggrieved by a final order of the Circuit Court 
of Arlin~on County, Virginia, entered on the 24th day of 
.April, 1935, in an action a.t law, wherein the said petitioner 
was plaintiff, and Lyon, Incorporated, was defendant. A 
· transcript of the record of the proceedings of said action 
and the said final order therein, duly . certified is herewith 
filed and asked to be taken as a part of this petition, in which 
the errors hereinafter complained of appear. 
The plaintiff in this petition for a writ of error was plain-
tiff in the court below, and will hereinafter be called the 
"plaintiff". The defendant herein was defendant below, and 
will be called ''defendant''· 
STATEMENT OF CASE. 
This case originated by the filing of a notice of motion 
for judgment on behalf of the plaintiff to recover money dam-
ages for injuries received by him on the 31st day of October, 
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1934, when a scaffold, alleged to have been owned, controlled 
and constructed by the defendant, collapsed with the plaintiff 
and one, H. T. Harrison, while they were· engaged in the act 
of installing roofing on a house being then constructed by 
the defendant in Lyon Village, Arlington County, Virginia. 
(R., p. 1.) 
This- suit was for $2,500.00, the same being for compensa-
tion for money expended for doctors' bills, the loss of time 
from work and damages for pain and suffering, etc. (R., 
p. 1.) 
This said notice of motion for judgment filed in the Clerk's 
office of the Circuit Court of Arlington County, January 
26th, 1935, charged as follows: 
"That heretofore, to-wit, on the 31st day of October, 1934, 
'vhile working on a building being located in Lyon Village, 
Arlington County, Virginia, and being a. house under con-
struction and owned andjor constructed under your control, 
a scaffold on 'vhich I was standing while working on the 
aforesaid building collapsed, which scaffold was put there 
and constructed for me and· others by your servants, agents 
and employees while acting within the scope of their employ-
ment and under your direction and for said purpose, but said 
scaffold was so insecurely and 'veakly constructed by the 
aforesaid agents, servants and employees, tha.t in collapsing 
as a result of the negligent construction by the aforesaid 
agents, servants and employees, I 'vas thrown to ground and 
was hurt • • • . " (R., p. 7.) 
This notice of motion for judgment was returnable to the 
18th day of Fehruf:try, 19'35, the 1st day of the February term 
of Court. (R., p. 1.} On the return day, counsel for plain-
tiff, in open court, moved the court to require the attorney 
for the defendant to file its grounds of defense 'vithin 10 days, 
which motion the court granted. (R., p. 3.) The case was 
continued for that term, and set for trial on April 22nd, 1935, 
seven days after the 1st day of the April term of Court. 
(R., p. 3.) The ·defendant by its attorneys filed its grounds 
of defense on the 18th da.y of February, 1935, the day the 
court entered the order for the defendant to file its grounds 
of defense. 
The said grounds of defense are, to-wit: 
''Now comes the defendant and denies that the plaintiff 
was working for the defendant or under his control at the 
time and place mentioned in the motion, or that the scaffold 
therein mentioned was put there or constructed for the plain-
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tiff or others by the servants, agents or employees of the de-
fendant or was insecurely and weakly constructed, and alleged 
that the injury if any resulting to the plaintiff was either 
the result of his own negligence in overloading said scaffold, 
or the negligence of those over whom the defendant had no 
control, and will rely upon any other failure of the plaintiff 
to prove any and all of the allegations in his motion." (R., 
p. 5.) 
There 'vas no affidavit :filed with this plea which put in 
issue the fact of ownership, operation or control of the scaf- · 
fold. ( R., p. 5.) 
When the Circuit Court of Arlington County convened on 
April 15th, 1935, the ·first day of its April term, this case was 
continued and set down for trial on the 22nd day of April, 
the day theretofore designated by the Court on the 1st day of 
the February term, the same being the return day of the 
notice. At this time no additional pleas were filed by the de-
fendant or offered by it. (R., p. 7.) 
The case made up upon the foregoing notice of motion 
and grounds of defense filed by the defendant the 18th day 
of February, came to trial on the 22nd day of April, 1935. 
(R., p. 11). The jury was impanelled and sworn. The open-
ing statement in behalf of the plaintiff w·as made. Counsel 
for the defendant made the opening statement in behalf of the 
defendant, wherein it 'vas stated that the defendant would 
develop evidence to show that the defendant had· nothing to 
do with the erection, or any use of the scaffold. Thereupon, 
counsel for the plaintiff objected to any such statement in 
that the ownership or control of the scaffold was not in issue 
as the defendant did not file an affidavit along with its plea, 
putting· in issue the fact of ownership or control of the scaf-
fold as required by Section 6126 of the Code, and, therefore, 
the ownership or control of the scaffold was admitted or pre-
sumed to be in the defendant as a matter of law. At this 
point in the trial the Court dismissed the jury from the room 
' and stated the question may as well be settled then and there. 
Counsel for the defendant moved the Court for leave to amend 
the said plea by allowing the defendant to swear to it. The 
Court granted the motion ove'r the objection of the plaintiff. 
(R., pp. 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.) 
The jury was brought back in and the trial was resumed. 
(R., p. 16.) It is to this action of the Court, along 'vith 
other errors com1nitted by it, that this petition is presented, 
all of which will be hereinafter assigned. 
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ASSIGNJ\t!ENT OF ERRORS. 
Your petitioner assigns as error the action of the trial 
Court in the following particulars : · 
1. In allowing the defendant to s'vear to its plea denying 
the ownership or control of tlw scaffold after the trial had 
begun, over the objection of the plaintiff. (R., p. 19.) 
2. In allowing the defendant to put on evidence, over the 
objection of the plaintiff, denying the ownership or control 
of the scaffold because the defendant had failed to file an 
affidavit along 'vith its plea putting in issue its denial of the 
ownership or control of the scaffold. (R., p. 20.) 
3. In refusing to grant plaintiff's instruction number io 
'vherein the Court was called upon to instruct the jury that 
as a matter of law it was presumed that the defendant owned, 
operated or controlled the scaffold which collapsed with the 
plaintiff. (R., p. 21.) 
4. In refusing to set the verdict of the jury for the de-
fendant aside and grant a new trial on the ground that the 
verdict was contrary to the law and evidence. In that the 
Court erred in allowing the defendant to swear to its plea 
denying the ownership or control of the scaffold after the 
trial had begun; in allowing the defendant to put on evidence 
over the objection of the plaintiff denying the ownership or 
control of ·the scaffold; in refusing to give plaintiff's in-
struction number 10, wherein the jury was instructed as a 
n1atter of la'v it 'vas presumed that the defendant owned or 
controlled the scaffold. ( R., p. 22.) 
THE LAW AND ARGU~IENT. 
It may readily be seen from the record the position of 
the plaintiff in this case to be that he was greatly prejudiced 
by the trial court's action in affirmatively annulling and void-
ing an express statutory provision, namely, Section 6126 of the 
Code, which waives for both the plaintiff and the defendant 
the burden to prove the ownership, operation or control of an 
instrumentality where such is alleged in any pleading filed in 
an action at law, unless an affidavit be filed with the plead-
ing putting it in issue, denying specifically and with particu-
larity that such property or instrumentality was, at the time 
alleged, so owned, operated or controlled. 
There is no denial on the part of the defendant that the 
plaintiff failed to sufficiently and clearly to charge the defend-
ant with the ownership, ope·ra.tion, control a.nd construction 
of the scaffold within the meaning of Section 6126 of the 
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Code. This is admitted by the defendant in filing its plea 
and its subsequent motion to the court wherein it asked leave 
to amend its plea by swearing to it. 
There is actually only one primary question to be determined 
here in the case at bar, and all of the assignments of error 
are incidental to it. That question is: can a trial court in 
its discretion waive an express statutory provision such as 
Section 6126 of the Code 1 The statute is as follows : 
"Where a bill, declaration or other pleading alleges that 
any person or corporation, at a stated time, own·ed, operated 
or controlled any property or instrun1entality, no proof of 
the fact. alleged shall be required unless an affidavit be filed 
·with th{~ pleading putting it in issue, denying specifically and . 
with particularity that such property or instrumentality was,· 
at the time alleged so o-wned, operated or controll.ed. '·' 
It is submitted that the trial court cannot nullify and void 
this statute in its discretion by allowing the defendant to 
swear to its plea after. the issue is made up and the trial 
beg'Un. It is highly prejudicial to the person who relies upon 
the statute-the plaintiff in this case. The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant owned and controlled the house, and that 
it constructed the scaffold which, of course, was attached to 
the house, and wl1ich was put there for the use of plaintiff 
while he was .working on the house for the defendant. That 
the scaffold 'vas not the defendant's, if true, was within the 
peculiar knowledge of the defendant, and if the defendant 
desired to deny its o'vnership and put plaintiff to proof on 
same, it is provided by the statute, that it must so warn the 
plaintiff by the filing of an affidavit in order to give him 
an opportunity to discover evidence and produce proof there-
of. 
In this case at bar the plaintiff brought himself within the 
meaning of the statute by proper allegations and charges in 
his notice of motion. This notice was returnable on the 18th 
day of February, 1935. That was the first day of the Feb-
ruary term of court. When the docket 'vas called plain-
tiff's counsel asked the court to enter an order to require 
the defendant to file its grounds of defense within 10 days. 
In compliance 'vith this order, the defendant filed its grounds 
of defense by competent counsel on the same day. The case 
was set for trial on a day during the April term of Court. 
Two terms of Court convened without the defendant :filing 
any other pleading, all the while leaving the plaintiff to be-
lieve that its denial of the o'vnership or control of the scaf-
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fold was not in issue since no affidavit was filed in accord-
ance with the statute. 
In consequence of the defendant's failure to file its afli-
davit, the plaintiff came to trial on April 22nd not prepared 
to prove ownership or control of the scaffold which collapsed. 
The record v.rill sho'v .that counsel for defendant in en-
deavoring to get around the prejudice done the plaintiff 
by the trial court in granting the motion to amend the de-
fendant's plea by allo\\ring it to be sworn to after the trial 
had begun, expressed a v.rillingness for the plaintiff to have 
continuance. (R., p. 16.) This does not cure the overriding 
by the trial court of a statute 'vhich is not discretionary in 
the trial court. So far as the case at bar is concerned the 
issues W·ere made up by the notice of motion and the grounds· 
of defense filed by the defendant pursuant to the order entered 
on the 18th day of February, 1935, giving the defendant 10 
days to :file its grounds of defense. Under Section 6126 of 
the Code and said order, the defendant could not come into 
court 22 days later, and on the day of trial, after the jury 
had been impanelled and sworn, then ~mend its plea by swear-
ing to it. The trial court in allowing it not only annulled 
and vitiated a positive statutory provision, but it also dis-
regarded the order of the Court requirement for the defend-
ant to file its grounds of defense. It is submitted that this 
is gross error. The issues of the ease were already made 
up. . 
In V a;nder.q'l·ift v. SU!Iwmerall, 158 ;v a. 725, 164 S. E. 718, a 
case ·from the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, 
the facts 'vere these : 
The plaintiff filed a petition for an attachment against 
the defendants and stated that it was for personal injuries 
sustained due to the negligent operation of automobile o'vned 
and operated by defendant or his agent or servant. To this 
attachment petition the defendant did nothing except file an 
affidavit setting forth he had a substantial defense. After 
plaintiff's evidence was completed, the defendant offered to 
file an affidavit setting out the fact that the driver of the 
offending cab was not his servant or agent and also offered 
evidence tending to prove these facts. This the trial court 
·refused to do. In that case as in the case at bar no affidavit 
was filed when the case came on for trial Mr. Justice Holt, 
delivering the opinion of the Court, said : 
"No affidavit was filed and so the plaintiff had the right 
to assume~ that agency was admitted, and did not come pre-
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pared to prove it. Manifestly it would have been unfair to 
require her to do so after she had closed her case in chief.'' 
In the case of Carlton v. JJ!lartin, 160 Va. 149, 168 S. E. 348, 
page 157 of 160 Va., 168 S. E. 348, 350, Mr. Justice Gregory 
said: 
''The notice filed in the present case contained no specific 
allegation that ~Irs. Eva J. 1\{artin owned, operated, or con-
trolled the automobile involved here, and consequently it 
was entirely proper for her counsel to introduce evidence 
sho,ving that she did not own, operate or control the said 
automobile. The statute required no affidavit in this case. The 
court erroneously excluded this line of testimony which has 
been previously referred to. Counsel for 1\irs. Eva Martin 
had this to say regarding the statute: The purpose of the 
legislature should not be ignored. That purpose was to make 
it unnecessary to prove ownership or agency where owner-·· 
ship or agency is alleged, unless an affidavit is filed putting 
the matter in issue. The statute is a wise one, hut it may 
not be invoked unless proper allegations are made. It was 
not the purpose of the statute to catch the unwary, but to 
obviate the necessity of provi-ng matter 'vhich rests peculiarly 
in the possession of the defendants. Counsel's observation, 
in our judgment clearly expresses the correct view.'' 
The case of Kirn v. Bem,bu.ry, 178 S. E. 57, there 'vas no 
specific allegation that l{irn, as distinguished from Charley 
Elliott (both sued as joint tort-feasors), owned, operated, or 
controlled the truck. And in that case Emily Bembury, the 
plaintiff, 'vithout objection, permitted evidence to be intro.: 
duced which, if true, clearly showed that Kirn was neither 
the owner nor operator of the truck, nor was he in any 'vay 
responsible for the. acts of Charley Elliott. In that case l{irn 
failed to file the affidavit required by Code, Section 6126. That 
was not necessary to preclude him from putting on evidence 
to show that he was not the owner or operator of the truck, 
as the notice did not specifically charge it, and that is true, 
moreover, where the introduction of the evidence was not 
timely objected to by the plaintiff. 
In the case at bar ,the notice alleges and charges in ac-
cordance with Section 6126 of the Code. There was also 
timely objection to the introduction of any evidence by the 
defendant to deny the ownership, operation or construction 
of the scaffold. And the case at bar comes fully within the 
observation made by counsel in the case of Carlton v. Martin, 
heretofore cited, which observation was adopted by Mr. Jus-
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tice Gregory in the opinion of the Court, which he delivered 
in that case. 
In Gree.·n v. L·unt, 147 Va. 392, 137 S. E. 484, which construed 
Section 6126, the facts were: 
I sum, the plaintiff, sued Green and his daughter, J\ilrs. Ran-
dall, and charged that the defendants operated and ran a.n 
automobile. No affidavit was filed by the defendants putting 
the matter in issue. The Court held that no proof was re-
quir·ed unless an affidavit was filed. If it had been the plain-
tiff might have proved the relation of master and servant, or 
other facts which would have imposed liability upon Green. 
In the absence of the affidavit no such burden was imposed 
upon the plaintiff. That opinion was given upon the proposi-
tion of a demurrer to the evidence which was filed by the de-
fendant, predicated upon the failure of the plaintiff, Lum, 
to prove agency. 
HAS THE COURT THE DISCRETIONARY POWER TO 
ALLOW COUNSEL TO A~fEND WHERE AFFI-
DAVIT WAS NOT FILED AS REQUIR.ED 
UNDER CODE,· SEC. 1626f 
Couns·el for the defendant took the position that it was the 
duty of the court to aUow an amendment of the pleading at 
any time before trial. (R., p. 14.) Concede that to be true, 
the trial in this case at bar had actually begun and 'vas under 
way. , 
In Green v. Lu,tn, supra, the Court said that Section 6126 
was modeled after the preceding section and was highly 
remedial and should be construed liberally. That is not in-
consistent with the opinions of the Court in the case of Carl-
ton v. Martin, supra, and approved in the case of Kirn v. Rem-
bury, sup~ra. 
Concede that the statute should be liberally construed, it 
is hot evident that the Court in the Green v. Lum case in-
tended to actually destroy and nullify the intention of the 
legislature, which in~eution the Court has construed in the 
Carlton v. Martin case, supra, and cit-ed in Kirn v. Bembury, 
supra. 
What practical effect, to effect a remedy, would Section 
6126 have, if a defendant could at any time during a trial 
file an affidavit as required by the Code. To allow this would 
simply render the statut-e impotent and meaningless. The 
substantiability of the law is destroyed. The law would be 
one thing one day, som-ething else the next day. One. trial 
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judge's conscience might be very good, another narrow or 
indifferent. Another may have a foot of conscjence, another 
a yard of conscience. So that if the maxim of ''Equity fol-
lows the la,v'' is recognized here, then the most substantial 
justice could best be attained by the trial court following the 
law as is expressly stated in the statute. 
WHAT IS A REMEDIAL STATUTE AND FOR WHAT 
PURPOSE WAS IT ENACTED BY THE 
LEGISLATURE? 
"A remedial statute has for its object either to redress 
some existing grievances to introduce some new regulation or 
proceeding conducive to the public good.'' 
, 
Baylias v. Crecey, 30 Ill. App. 105. 
''A remedial statute has for its object the redress of some 
existing grievance or the introduction of some regulation or 
proceeding conducive to public gopd, and is either affirmative 
or negative as it ·prescribes or prohibits anything in particular 
to be done or omitted.'' 
Voo Hock v. Whitlock, N.Y. 2 Edw. Ch. 304, 310. 
''A statute that provides a rule of practice or a course of 
procedure, or a method of review, is 'remedial' in its nature 
and should be broadly and liberally construed to accomplish 
the purpose of its enactment.'' 
Tr-irami Co. v. City of Dayton, 110 N. E. 726, 92 Ohio.215. 
Now, if the trial Court allows an affidavit to be :filed at 
any time contrary to the words of the statute, Section 6126, 
ho'v can the purpose of the legislature be enforced and what 
is the purpose of the legislature untler various and sundry 
sets of facts and circumstances? In Kirn v. Bembury, citing 
and approving an observation of counsel in Carlton v. Mar-
tin, supra, the court said : 
"Counsel for 1\irs. Eva Martin has this to say regarding 
the statute. The purpose of the legislature should not be 
ignored. That purpose 'vas tp make it unnecessary to prove 
ownership or agency where ownership or agency is alleged, 
.unless an affidavit is filed putting the matter in issue. The 
statute is a wise one, but it may not be invoked unless' prope1· 
allegations are made. It was not the purpose of the statute 
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to catch the unwary l1ut to obviate the necessity of proving 
matter which rests peculiarly in the possession of the de-
fendants. Counsel's observation, in our judgment, clearly 
expresses the correct view.'' 
It cannot be contended that the defendant 'vas un'vary 
in the case at bar. !{ere it filed, by competent counsel of 
long1 experience, its grounds of defense pursuant to the order 
entered on the 18th day of February. That term of court 
went by; the April term came and the case was called, and 
recognized as set for trial on April 22, 1935, which day 
was designated on the call of the docket on the opening day 
of the February term. 
It is respectfully submitted for the reasons stated, the ends 
of justice require that the verdict of the jury in favor of 
the defendant be set aside, and a new trial be awarded the 
plaintiff as made upon the pleadings of February 18th, 1935. 
The petitioner prays that a writ of error may be awarded 
him for the review of his case. 
The petitioner adopts the foregoing petition as his brief 
in this case and respectfully request that his counsel may 
be permitted to state orally the reasons for reviewing the 
verdict, judgment and errors hereinbefore complained of. 
Your petitioner avers that a copy of the foregoing petition 
was on the 15th day of July, 1935, delivered to counsel for 
the defendants in error. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. R. AHALT, 
JOHN LOCiill GREEN, 
Couns·el for Plaintiff in Error. 
The undersigned counsel practicing in the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia, doos hereby certify that in their 
opinion it is proper that the verdict, judgment and error com-
plained of in the above entitled case should be reviewed. 
l{.eceived 10:9-35. 
C. R. AHALT, 
JOHN LOCI(E GltEEN, 
EMERY N. HOSMER. 
G. L. B. 
November 20, 1935. Writ of error awarded by the court. 
Bond, $300. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
NOTICE OF l\1:0TION IFOR JUDGMENT. 
Filed January 26, 1935. 
To Lyon, Incorporated: 
You are hereby notified that on the 18th day of Febru-
ary, 1935, at 10:00 A. M. o'clock of that day, or as soon there-
after as satne can be heard, the undersigned 'viii move the 
Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, at the Court 
House thereof, for a judgment against you for the sum of $2,-
500.00, said sum being due and owing to the undersigned for 
damages hereinafter set forth, for that, to-,vit: 
That heretofore, to-wit, on the 31st day of October, 1934, 
while working on a building within the scope of my employ-
ment and for you, sairl: building being located in Lyon Vii-
gale, Arlington County, Virginia, and being a house under 
construction and owned andjor constructed under your con-
trol, a scaffold on which I was standing while working on the 
aforesaid building· collapsed, which scaffold was put ·there 
and constructed for me and others by your servants, agents 
and employees while acting within the scope of their employ-
ment and under your direction and for said purpose, but 
said scaffold was so insecurely and weakly constructed by the 
aforesaid agents, servants and employees, that in collaps-
ing as a result of the neg·ligent construction by the aforesaid 
ag·ents, servants and employees, I was thro'vn to the ground 
and was injured, hurt,. bruised and suffered great shock, in 
that my shoulder was dislocated, three ribs were fractured 
and other bodily injuries received, all of which has caused 
1ne to lose time from n1y work; has caused me to incur ex-
pensive medical treatment; has inconvenienced me and kept 
me from my business, and has left n1e in such condition that 
I may be per1nanently injured as a result of the aforesaid 
negligence of your servants, agents and employees while act-
ing within the scope of their employment for you 
page 2} by reason of their failure to make the aforesaid 
to do. 
scaffold a safe place to 'vork upon as was your duty 
Wherefore judgment for the sum of $2,500.00 will be asked 
at the hands of said court at the time and place aforesaid. 
WILLIA~I J. LOUGH, 
C. R. AHALT, By Counsel. 
,TOHN LOCKE GREEN, Counsel. 
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Executed this 26th day of January, 1935, by serving a 
true copy of the within notice of motion on Lawrence Michael, 
agent ·of Lyon, Inc., found at the office of L;yon, Inc., in Ar-
ling-ton County, Virginia. 
Given under n1y hand this 26th day of January, 1935. 
H. B. FIELDS, 
Sheriff of Arlington County, Va .. 
By H. L. WOODYARD, 
Deputy Sheriff. 
We the Jury on the issue Joined find for the defendant. 
S. A. SIIELTON, Foreman. 
ORDER-ENTERED FEBRUARY 18, 1935. 
page 3} (Lough v. Lyon, Inc.) 
The Attorney for the Plaintiff moved the Court to require 
the Attorney for the Defendant to file its grounds of defense 
within ten days, which motion the Court granted, and this 
case is continued and set for trial on April 22nd, 1935. J ohu 
S. Barbour and Harry R. Thomas noted their appearance as 
Attorneys for the Defendant. 
WALTER T. ~IcCARTHY, Judge. 
ORDER-ENTERED FEBRUARY 18,.1935. 
page 4 ~ (Harrison v. Lyon, Inc~) 
The Attorney for the Plaintiff moved the Court to require 
the Attorney for the Defendant to file its grounds of defense 
within ten days, which motion the Court granted, and this 
case is continued and set for trial on April 22nd, 1935. John 
S. Barbour and Harry R. Thomas noted their appearance 
as Attorneys for the Defendant. 
WALTER T. McCARTHY, J~dge. 
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ON NOTICE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
PLEA OF DE]~NDANT. 
page 5 ~ Filed February 18, 1935. 
Now comes the defendant and denies that the plaintiff was 
working for the defendant or under his control at the time 
and place mentioned in the.motion, or that the scaffold therain 
mentioned was put there or constructed for the plaintiff or 
others by the servants, agents or employees of the defend-
ant, ·or under its direction, and denies that the scaffold re-
ferred to was constructed by the agents, servants and enl· 
ployees of the defendant or was insecurely and weakly con-
structed, and alleges that the injury, if any, resulting to the 
plaintiff 'vas either the result of his own negligence in over-
loading said scaffold, or the neglig·ence of others over whom. 
the defendant had no control, and will rely upon any other 
failure of the plaintiff" to prove any and all of the allegations 
in his motion. 
JOHN S. BARBOUR, 
HARRY R. THOMAS, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
I hereby solemnly swear that the above statement is true 
to the best of my knowledge & belief. 
FRANI{ LYON, 
Pres. Lyon Inc. 
Subscribed & sworn to before me this 22 day of April, 1935. 
JOHN A. PETTY, 
Clerk Circuit Court. 
ON NOTICE OF MOTION ·FOR JUDGMENT. 
PLEA OF DEFENDANT. 
page 6 ~ 'Filed February 18, 1935. 
Now con1es the defendant and denies that the plaintiff· was 
working for the defendant or under his control at the time 
and place mentioned in the motion or that the scaffold therein 
mentioned was put there or constructed for the plaintiff or 
others by the servants, _ag·ents or employees of the defendant, 
or under its direction, and denies that the scaffold referred 
·to was constructed by the agents; servants and employees . Qf 
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the defendant or was insecurely and weakly constructed, and 
alleges that the injury, if any, resulting- to the plaintiff was 
either the result of his own negligence in over loading said 
scaffold, or the negligence of others over whom the defend-
ant had no control, and will rely upon any other failur~ of 
the plaintiff to prove any and all of the allegations in his 
motion. 
JOHN S. BARBOUR, 
HARRY R. THOMAS, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
I hereby solemnly swear that the above statement is true 
to the best of my knowledge ~ belief. 
FRANK LYON, 
Pres. Lyon Inc. 
Subscribed & Sworn to before tne 0 this 22 day of April, 
1935. 0 
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JOHN A. PETTY, 
Clerk Circuit Court. 
ORDER-ENTERED APRIL 15, 1935 .. 
(Lough v. Lyon, Inc.) 
This Case is continued and set for trial on April 22nd, 
1935 .. 
WALTER T. McCARTHY, Judge. 
ORDER-ENTERED APRIL 15, 1935. 
page 8 ~ (Harrison v. Lyon, Inc.) 
This Case is continued and set for trial on April 22nd, 
1935. 
WALTER T. McCARTHY, Judge. 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE SUITS. 
page 9 ~ Entered April 22, 1935. 
It Appearing to the Court that William J. Lough and H. 
T. Harrison each having :filed in the Circuit Court of Arling-
ton County, Virginia, their separate notice of motions for 
William J. Lough v. Lyon, Incorporated. 15 
judgment against the same defendant, Lyon, Inc., and conn-· 
sel for both plaintiff and defendant having agreed to have 
the san1e tried at the same time in said court before the same 
jury, It Is Therefore Ordered and Decreed that the two 
causes be so tried at the same time and before the same jury 
on the day heretofore set for trial or thereafter as the court 
may determine. 
WALTER T. McCARTHY, Judge. 
page 10 ~ ORDER-ENTERED APRIL 24, 1935. 
Pursuant to adjournment, this day came the plaintiffs and 
their counsel and the defendant and its counsel. Thereupon 
the jury were polled and instructed by the Court, closing ar-
guments 'vere made to the jury by J. Vaughan Gary, counsel 
for the plaintiff, I-I. T. Harrison; H. R. Thomas and JohnS. 
Barbour, counsel for the defendant;- and C. R. Ahalt, counsel 
for the plaintiff, William J. Lough, and the jury retired to 
their room and after a time returned into Court and presented 
the following verdict, to-wit: 
''We, the Jury, on the issue joined find for the defendant. 
"(Signed) S . .A.. SHELTON, Foreman." 
(In both cases.) 
Thereupon, C. R. Ahalt, counsel for the plaintiff, William 
J. Lough, made a motion to set aside the verdict of the jury 
as being· contrary to the law and evidence in the case, and 
on the further ground tha.t the Court erred in permitting the 
defendant to verify its plea denying ownership, operation or 
control of the scaffold after the trial had begun which was to 
the prejudice of the plaintiffs, which motion the Court denied. 
WALTER. T. McCARTHY, Judge. 
page 11 ~ The evidence and incidents of the trial pertain-
. ing to the bill of exceptions taken in the case of 
Willian1 J. Lough, complainant, v. Lyon, Incorporated, de-
fendant, taken before Ron. Walter T. McCarthy, Judge of 
the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, at the Ar-
ling-ton County Courthouse, Clarendon, Virginia, on the 22nd 
and 23rd day of April, 1935, to be read as evidence in the 
above entitled cause. 
16 Supreme Court of Appeals of. Virginia.. 
Appearances: C. R. Ahalt, Esq., and John L. Green, Esq., 
counsel for Wm. J. Ldugh; ·J. Vaughan Gary, Esq., counsel 
for H. T. Harrison; H. R. Thomas, Esq., and Jno. S. Bar-
bour, Esq., counsel for Lyon, Inc.; The plaintiffs, Lough and 
Harrison, in their own proper persons; The defendant, Frank 
Lyon, for Lyon, Inc. in his own proper person. 
Opening statement of 1\Ir. John S. Barbour: 
May it please the Court and Gentlemen of the Jury: 
1\{r. Thomas and I represent the defendant, Lyon Incor-
porated, in this case. 
We expect the evidence, as it will be developed before you, 
will show you that Lyon, Inc., had nothing more to do with · 
the erection or any use of that scaffold for the plaintiffs in 
this case than--
Mr. Ahalt: If the Court please-Mr. Barbour, pardon me. 
I do not believe that that is the issue in this case~ There is 
no verified plea in this case and there is a direct allegation-
Court : Let the jury retire. We may as well take this mat-
ter up right now. 
(Thereupon the jury retii~ed to its room and the following 
transpired :) 
page 12 ~ Mr. Barbour: I do not understand the gTounds 
of the objection. 
Mr. Ahalt: The ground is : this notice of motion charges 
specifically that the plaintiffs, on a day certain, 'vere working-
on a building, within the scope of their employment, for the 
defendant, being a house under construction owned and un-
der the control of the defendant and a scaffold upon which 
they were standing, while working on the building; collasped; 
which scaffold was put there and constructed by their agents, 
servants and employees, while ·acting in the scope of their em-
ployment, and, if we understand the law, if that ownership 
and control is to be denied, it should have been accompanied 
by an affidavit. This was not done in this case and, there-
fore, I say that the ownership and control of this scaffold is 
not an issue in this case. 
Mr. Barbour: I do not appreciate what the gentleman is 
driving at. The denial is that the plaintiff was 'vorking for 
the defendant or under his control or that the scaffold men-
tioned was put there by the servants, agents or employees 
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of the defendant or under its direction and denies that the 
scaffold referred to was constructed by the agents, servants 
or employees,. or was instrumental in the construction thereof 
and we say that the resulting injury to the plaintiff was the 
result either of his own negligence, in overloading the scaf-
fold, or the neg·ligence of others over whom the defendant 
had no control. .A.nd we will rely upon any further facts 
to prove all allegations in this motion. That is the joined 
issue on that plea and, it seems to me, that is the whole thing. 
Mr. Ahalt: There are several issues raised by the p1ea 
and ownership is not denied. . . 
1\{r. Barbour: We are not denying· ownership 
page 13 }- of the property. 
Mr. Ahalt: We submit it is ownership of the 
property and the scaffold, itself. 
1\{r. Barbour: Vve deny the specific allegation of your plea. 
Court: You admit that the issue "ras raised but they didn't 
do it under oath. You rely on the section of the Code which 
requires them to have done that? 
Mr. Ahalt: In other words, in this case there are several 
issues raised and among them is the one that they deny own-
ership of the scaffold. They say Lough wasn't e-ven work· 
ing for them. 
Mr. Barbour: We do not deny he was working under con-
tract but he was not an employee. 
Court: "When did .you join issue on this pleading! When 
was it filed? 
~Ir. Ahalt: The plea was filed on the 18th of February 
and the trial set at that time. 
Court: Presuming that they must have denied it under 
oath, is what I am coming to. Under the statute, they did 
have to deny this ownership and operation and control of 
the scaffold under oath and that they didn't do; however, they 
have denied it, even if not under oath, and you joined the is-
sue. Doesn't that have the same effect as being under oath 1 
1\{r. Ahalt: Ida not think it serves the purpose at all. We 
could not do anything else. 
Court: ·You can move to strike it. 
Mr. Ahalt: They say they will advance a half dozen de-
fences and such others as they feel will be available to them 
and we say that under the law, the same as under another law, 
it can be considered as bein~ just the same in another case 
as if they denied the operating of an automobile. They deny 
ownership and control over that scaffold and it is not a mat-
ter of joined issues but a matter of pleading, the 
page 14 }- same as any other matter. . 
Mr. Barbour: I did not think an oath was nee-
18 Supreme Oourt of .Appeals of Yirginin. 
essary but if the oath is neces~ary, we ask permission to 
have it sworn to. 
Mr. Ahalt: We object to that. This case is at trial and if 
your Honor recalls, in the Rieder v. Garfield M a;nor case, you 
denied us the privilege, even before the second case came to 
trial. We denied ownership and your Honor said this case 
was at issue and you struck that pleading out, 'vhich had been 
filed in between court terms, on the motion of counsel, and it 
was about three months before the case came to trial. 
]}fr. Barbour: It is the duty of this court, at any time be-. 
fore the trial, to allow a~ .amendment of the pleading. 
Mr. Ahalt: It is not an an1endment.. 
~[r. Barbour: It is. If you will look, you have had full 
notice of it and have taken the issue. 
Court: Overrule the objection. 
Mr. Ahalt: We note an exception and would like to pre-
pare a memorandum and I 'vant to say, for the information 
of the Court and for the record, that the plaintiff's case, by 
requiring· us to establish ownership and control over this 
scaffold, inasmuch as this case has gotten to the point of 
trial to a point where the jury has been sworn and the open.:. 
ing statement made to the jury, by counsel, that 've would 
be greatly prejudiced by continuing with this trial under 
those circumstances and because of the fact that under the 
law, Section 6126 of the Code, that we had a right to rely 
upon the facts that there would be no controversy, no dispute 
whatever, and, as we understand the law, that no evidence is 
admissible to controvert ownership where the plea, which 
was filed in this case on February 18th, 1935, was not ac-
companied by a sworn statement, as required by Sec-
tion 6126. 
page 15 } Court: You made a statement but what are you 
asking the Court to do, Mr .. Ahalt 1 
Mr. Ahalt : We stand on our rights, under the circum-
stances, and our understanding· of the law. 
Mr. Barbour: Wbat do you consider your rights,; what 
do you want the Court to do Y 
Court: Are you stating the grounds of your objection 1 
You are willing to go ahead f 
Mr. Ahalt: I have stated my objection. 
Court: Your objection is overruled and there is nothing to 
rule on unless you are making further objection. · 
}vir. A.halt: The basis of my opinion is the basis of my 
exception that I took to your Honor's ruling. 
· Court: I took that from what you said. Are you asking 
for a continuance or taking a non-suit 7 I don't know which 
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you are doing. That is why I asked you and I don't want 
to misunderstand. You are not doing that? 
1\fr. Ahalt: We are not asking for a non-suit and not ask-
ing for a continuance. 
Court: ·You are just standing on the grounds of your ob-jection? · 
lVIr. Ahalt: We are standing on our rights; our understand-
ing of the law and we object to the introduction of any evi-
dence conh·overting ownership. 
Court: All right. 
Mr. Ahalt: There is one other thing I might add and that 
is that the evidence, which we will now introduce, is offered 
because of the Court's ruling and, of course, does not pre·· 
judice any of our rig·hts in the case. 
Court: I understand that. There is now nothing to rule 
on and Mr. Barbour can go al1ead with his state-
page 16 ~ ment. . 
Mr. Barbour : I want to say this : If the gentle-
men on the other side claim they are prejudiced in any way 
or taken by surprise, I am willing· for them to have a con-
tinuance of the case. 
Court: I have given them the opportunity. Of course, the 
Garfield 1\tianor case had a hung jury and the pleading was 
filed between that trial and the next one and I would not let 
the1n change the issue. 
1\'Ir. Barbour: vV e ask to have this pleading supported by 
affidavit now. 
1\fr. Ahalt: To which we object, of course. 
Court: 1\tiotion granted. 
1\fr. 1\.halt.: We object and note an exception. 
(Thereupon Frank Lyon, President the defendant, Lyon, 
Inc., mf}de affidavit before the Clerk of the Court, in each· 
ease.) · 
1\ir. Barbour: This affidavit is to be made in each of these 
cases. 
(Thereupon the jury returned to the courtroom and Mr. 
Barbour continued with his opening statement.) 
\ 
Evidence was then introduced on behalf of both plaintiffs 
and defendant on April 22, 23. and 24, 1935, at the conclu- · 
sion of which the court gave instructions on behalf of the 
plaintiffs and on behalf of the defendant, after which the 
fe-ll owing occurred: · 
Mr. Ahalt : We wish to offer another instruction. 
20 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
INSTRUCTION 10. 
The Court instructs the jury that under the pleadings in 
this case it is conclusively presumed as a matter of law that 
. the defendant, Lyon, Incorporated, did own and/or con-
trol the scaffold which collapsed 'vith the plaintiffs, Lough 
and Harrison, and therefore no evidence of such 
page 17 r ownership or control over said scaffold was nec-
essary on the part of the plaintiffs to establish that 
fact, and under such circumstances the defendant, nnder the 
law, owed the plaintiffs the duty of furnishing them a safe 
place whereon to perforn1 their work, and the plaintiffs had 
the right to assume that the scaffold found on Job 10 by the 
plaintiffs and owned and/or controlled by the defendant, was 
a safe place where~n to perform their work; and if you fur-
ther find that the said scaffold was so constructed and erected 
as to be insecure and an unsafe place whereon to work, and 
that said scaffold as a result thereof did collapse while plain-
tiffs were performing their work thereon, and that the in-
juries complained of by the plaintiffs were the proximate 
result thereof, then your verdict should be for the plaintiffs, 
unless you find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the plaintiffs were aware of the fact that said scaffold was 
not a safe place whereon to work-, or might have by the ex-
ercise of ordinary care discovered such fact, or were other-
wise g11ilty of contributory negligence; contributory negli-
gence, as used herein, means that the plaintiffs failed to ex-
ercise ordinary care under the circumstances. 
Court: That instruction is refused. 
Mr. Ahalt: We would like to amend this prayer by add-
ing in the second line after the word ''case'' the words ''at 
·the commencement of the trial in this cause''. I o:tfe.r that as 
an amendment. · 
Court: That is refu~ed. too. 
Mr. Ahalt : We note an exception. 
Thereupon the jury was instructed by the court, closing· 
arguments ·were had by counsel, the jury retired and brought 
in the verdict hereinafter shown in the the stipulation of 
counsel. 
page 18 ~ Thereupon Mr. Ahalt moved to have the Yerdict 
· set aside as contrary to the law and the evidence 
in the case, "'hich n1otion the Court denied and ~fr. Ahalt 
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The foregoing evidence and incidents on behalf of the plain-
tiffs William J. Lough and H. T. Harrison against Lyon, 
Incorporated, said cases having been tried together at the 
same tin1e and before. the same jury by agreement of all par-
ties, as denoted by the order of the Court, which order is set 
out in the stipulation. agTeement of counsel, is all of the evi-
doncP. and incidents of the trial of this cause, as pertaining 
to the matters and things and rulings of the Court con;t-
plained of in the bill of exceptions, No.1 to 4, inclusive, signed 
by the Court and made a part of this record herewith. 
Teste: this the 22nd day of May, 19~5. 
WALTER T. McCARTHY, Judge. 
page 19} EXCEPTION NUMBE·R ONE. 
Be it remembered that in the trial of this cause, the jury 
was impanelled and sworn and C. R. Ahalt, counsel for plain-
tiff William J. Lough made his opening statement to the jury 
in behalf the plahitiff and John S. Barbour, counsel for the 
defendant, Lyon, Incorporated, made his opening statement 
in behalf of the defendant and said that the defendant would 
show by the evidence that Lyon, Incorporated, had nothing 
to do "rith the erection or any use of that scaffold by the 
plaintiffs in the case than. 
That thereupon C. R.. Ahalt, counsel for the plaintiff in-
terrupted and objected to any evidence being introduced by 
the defendant denying that Lyon, Incorporated, owned, op-
erated or controlled the said scaffold as this was admitted by 
tho pleading· filed by the defendant putting the question in 
issue in that it was not denied by affidavit under section 6126 
of the Code of Virginia and therefore the ownership, opera-
tion or control of the scaffold \Vas admitted by the defendant. 
'\Vhereupon the jury was retired and counsel for the de-
fendant asked leave of the C'ourt to :file a sworn plea deny-
ing the ownership, operation or control of the scaffold as 
alleged in the notice of motion for judgment filed by the plain-
tiff, which motion the Court granted, and the defendant then 
and there affixed its affidavit to the plea theretofore filed by 
the defendant. 
To which ruling of the Court in allowing said plea to be 
sworn to and thereby allowing the defendant to introduce evi-
dence denying the ownership, operation or control or the 
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scaffold was then and there duly excepted to by counsel for 
the plaintiff as. being contrary to law. 
Teste: this the 22nd day of May, 1935. 
WALTER T. McCARTHY, J. 
page 20 ~ EXCEPTION NUMBER TWO. 
Be it remembered in the trial of this cause, that the de-
fendant, Lyon, Incorporated, introduced evidence denying the 
ownership, operation or control of the scaffold as alleged in 
the notice of motion for judg1nent filed by the plaintiff, Wil-
liam J. Lough against Lyon, Incorporated. 
That thereupon C. R. A.halt, counsel for plaintiff William 
J. Lough interposed his timely objection to such evidence 
being introduced on the gTound 'that where a bill, declaration, 
or other pleading alleges that any person or corporation, at 
a stated time owned, operated or controlled any property 
or instrumentality no proof of the fact alleged shall be re-
quired unless an affidavit be filed with the pleading putting 
it in issue; that the plaintiff Lough's notice of motion so al-
leged and the defendants failed to file an affidavit along with 
its plea putting it in i~sue. 
To which ruling of the court in allowing the defendant to 
put on said evidence, counsel for the plaintiff then and there 
duly excepted. · 
· Teste: this the 22nd day of ~fay, 1935. 
WALTER T. McCARTHY, Judge. 
page 21 ~ EXCEPTION NUMBER THREE. 
Be it remembered that in the trial of this cause, the plain-
tiff's counsel offered the follow!ng instruction in behalf of 
the plaintiff William J. Loug·h: 
. The Court instructs the jury that under the pleadings in 
this case it is conclusively presumed as a matter of law that 
the defendant Lyon, Incorporated, did own and/or control 
the scaffold which collapsed with the plaintiffs, Lough and 
Harrison, and ·therefore no evidence of such owners~ip or 
control over said scaffold was necessary on the part of the 
plaintiffs to establish that fact, and under such circumstances 
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the defendant, under the law, owed the plaintiffs the duty of 
furnishing them a safe place whereon to perform their work, 
and the plaintiffs had the right to assume that the scaffold 
found on Job 10 by the plaintiffs and owned andjor controlled 
by the defendant, was a safe place whereon to perform their 
work; and if you further find that the said scaffold was so 
constructed and erected as to be insecure and an unsafe place 
whereon to wok, and that said scaffold as a result thereof did 
collapse while plaintiffs \vere performing their work thereon, 
end tl1at the injuries complained of by the plaintiffs were 
the proximate result thereof, then your verdict should be for 
the plaintiffs, unless you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiffs were aware of the fact that said 
scaffold was not a safe place whereon to work, or might have 
by the exercise of ordinary care discovered such fact, or were 
otherwise guilty of contributory negligence; contributory neg-
ligence as used herein, means that the plaintiff failed to ex-
ercise ordinary care under the circumstances.'' 
The above instruction was refused by the Court. 
To which ruling of the court in refusing to grant said in .. 
~truction, the plaintiff then and there duly excepted. 
Teste: this the 22nd day of May, 1935. 
WALTER T. McCARTHY, Judge. 
page 22 }- EXCEPTION NUMBER FOUR. 
Be it remen1bered that in tl1e trial of this cause, the _jury 
having· retired and considered of its verdict upon all of the 
evidence, returned its verdict in the following words and :fig-
ures, to-wit: 
''We, the jury on the issue joined, find for the defendant. 
(Signed) S. A. SHELTON, Foreman." 
That the foregoing verdict of the jury was endorsed upon 
the notice of motion for jud~ent.in the case of William J. 
Lough against Lyon, Incorporated, defendant. 
That thereupon counsel for the plaintiffs moved the 
court to set the verdict of the jury aside and grant a new 
trial on the ground that the Court erred in permitting the de-
fendant to put in issue by amending and swearing to its plea 
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the ownership, operation or control of the scaffold referred 
to in the notice of motion after the trial had begun and in-
troduce evidence of said ownership, operation and control 
thereof to the prejudice of the plaintiffs, which motion this 
court denied. 
To which ruling of the Court in refusing· to set verdict 
aside as being contrary to law and evidence, in overruling the 
motion on behalf of the plaintiff, then and there duly ex-
cepted. 
Teste: this the 22nd day of ~Iay, 1935. 
WALTER T. McCARTHY, Judge. 
page 23 ~ NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR TRANS-
CRIPT OF RECORD. 
To John S. Barbour, Esq., and 
Harry R. Thomas, Esq., Attorneys for 
Lyon, Incorporated, defendants: 
Take notice that on the 22st day of May, 1935, the under-
signed will apply to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Ar-
lington County, Virginia, for a transcript of the record in the 
cause of William J. Loug·h v. against Lyon, Incorporated, 
wherein the verdict of the jury was rendered in favor of the 
defendant on April 24th, 1935, for the purpose of presenting 
said transcript to the Supreme Court of Apeals of Virginia, 
along with a petftion for a writ of error to the judgment of 
the said court, rendered in said cause of the 24th day of April, 
1935. 
Dated this the 7th day of 1\fay, 19R5. 
Legal service accepted. 
C. R. AHALT, 
JOHN LOCI{E GREEN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
JNO. S. BARBOUR, 
HARRY R. THOMAS, 
Attorney for I;yon, Inc. 
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page 24} To John· S. Barbour, Esq., and liarry R. Thomas, 
Esq., Attorneys for Lyon, Incorporated, Defend-
ant: 
Take notice that on the 22st day of May, 1935, the under-
signed will apply to and tender the Judge of the Circuit Court 
of Arlington County, Virginia, for his signature, certain cer-
tificates of exceptions to the rulings of the Court in the trial 
of the above entitled cause, for his action, over the objec-
tion of the plaintiff, in allowing the, defendant's counsel to 
verify its plea after the trial had begun, which verified plea 
d~nied the ownership, or control of the scaffold as alledged 
in the plaintiff's notice of motion for judgement against de-
fendant; for allowing the defendant to put on evidence deny-
ing the ownership or control of said scaffold over the ob-
jection of the plaintiff; for refusing to give instruction to 
jury that as a matter of law under the pleadings, the de-
fendant was presumed to own or control the scaffold as 
alledged in the notice of motion filed by the plaintiff against 
the defendant; for refusal of the Court to set aside the ver-
dict of the jury rendered in favor of the defendant on the 
24th day of April, 1935. Certificates of exceptions seen, to-
gether with the transcript of the record. 
The said Walter T. McCarthy, Judge of the Circuit Court 
of Arlington County, Virginia, will also be tendered such 
parts of the transcript of the record and incidents of the trial 
as is pertinent to this petition for a wi·it of error. 
Dated tbiA the 7th day of May, 1935. 
Legal Service Accepted. 
C. R. AHALT, 
JOHN LOCKE GREEN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
JNO. S. BARBOUR, 
HARRY R. THOMAS, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
page 25} STIPULATION OF COUNSEL. 
In the suits at law William J. Lough and H. T. Harrison 
are plaintiffs and Lyon, Incorporated, is defendant, pending 
in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, ;virginia, it is agreed 
that the following papers may be certified as parts of the 
recor.d to be presented to the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, along with a petition of plaintiffs for a writ of. error: 
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1. The Notice o£ motion for judgment filed January 26th, 
1935, by William J. Lough against Lyon, Incorporated. 
2. Order of the Court entered, February 18th, 1935, in the 
following words, to-wit: ''The Attorney for the plaintiff 
moved. the Court to require the Attorney for the defendant 
to :file its grounds of defense within ten days, which motion 
the court granted, and this case is continued and set for trial 
on April 22nd, 1935. John S. Barbour and Harry R. Thomas 
noted their appearance as attorneys for the defendant.'' 
3. Pleas of defendant, Lyon, Incorporated, filed February 
18th, 1935. 
4. Order of the court" ent~red April 15th, 1935, in the fol-
lowing words, to-wit: ''This case set for trial on April 22nd, 
1935. '' 
5. Order entered April 22nd, 1935, in the following words, 
to-wit: "It appearing to the Court that William J. Lough 
and H. T. Harrison each having filed in the Circuit Court of 
Arlington County, Virginia, their seperate notice of motions 
for judgn1ent against the same defendant, Lyon, Incorporated, 
and counsel for both plaintiff and defendant having agreed 
to have the same tried at the same time in said Court before 
the same jury. It is therefore, ordered and decreed that the 
two causes be so tried at the same time and before the same 
jury on the day heretofore set for trial or thereafter as the 
Court may determine.'' Show orders of continuance. 
6. The verdict of the jury of April 24th, 1935, duly re-
turned by the jury in the follo,ving words and figures, to-
wit: "We, the jury on the issued joined, find for the defend-
ant. 
(Signed) S. A. SHELTON, Forman." 
7. Order entered April 24th, 1935, in the following words, 
to-wit: ''Thereupon C. R. Ahalt, counsel for the plaintiff, 
William J. Lough, made a motion to set aside the verdict of 
the jury as being contrary to the law and evidence in the case, 
and on the further ground that the court erred in 
page 26 } permitting the defendant to verify its plea. deny-
ing ownership, operation or control of the scaf-
fold after the trial had begun which was to the prejudice of 
the plaintiffs, which motion the Court denied.'' 
8. The transcript of the evidence and incidents of the 
trial in the case, talmn down and transcribed by Agnes J. 
Conradi, 30 East Pershing Drive, Clarendon, Virginia, com-
prising exactly eleven pages, and being such evidence as is 
pertinent to the bills of Exceptions, identified a.nd certified 
by the Court. · · · 
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9. Instruction number ten offered by the plaintiff. 
10. Certificates of Walter T" McCarthy, Judge, signed May 
, 1935, ·numbered . 
11. It is hereby stipulated and made a part of the record 
by all parties that the pleadings filed and made a part of 
this record be considered as filed in both suits in the trial 
of the two cases together. It is further stipulated that both 
suits were tried together by the same jury who after hearing 
the evidence returned separate verdicts in each case, which 
were rec'd by the court and judgments entered thereon 
· severally. 
12. Notice of application for transcript of record. 
13. Notice of presentation of certificates of exception and 
application for certificate of evidence and incidents of trial. 
14. This agreement and stipulation. 
Given under our hands this the 22nd day of May, 1935. 
C. R. ARALT, and 
JOHN LOCICE .GREEN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
JNO . .S. BARBOUR and 
HARRY R. THOMAS, 
Attorneys for Defendant. 
page 27 r I, John A. Petty, Clerk of the Circuit Court of 
. Arling-ton County, Virginia, the same being a court 
of record, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true tran-
script of the record in the la'v suit of William J. Lough 
a,qainst Lyon, Incorporated, defendant, and in accordance with 
the stipulation and agreement of the parties. 
I further certify that notice of application to the clerk for 
this transcript of record was duly given and regular service 
thereof accepted by JohnS. Barbour and Harry R. Thomas, 
Attorneys for defendant, and that notice of tendering of the 
bills of exception and certification of the evidence by the 
Judge was duly given and regular service thereon accepted 
as. aforesaid. 
Given under my hand this the 14th day of June, 1935. 
I 
JOHN A. PETTY, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Arlington 
County, Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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